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U. S. News & World Report

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Allen Dulles Warns—

REDS PLAN "TO USE FREEDOM" TO DESTROY THE FREE

CPYRGHT

What the Kremlin plans to do next: infiltrate Communists into parliaments and trade-unions throughout the West.

The aim: a series of new coups, like that which toppled the Government of Czechoslovakia in 1948.

So concludes Allen W. Dulles, the Director

of the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Dulles explains how the new leaders of Russia "have told us what they propose to do," and he outlines the significance of those steps.

You get Mr. Dulles's views, too, on what the West can do to combat latest Soviet plans.


Following is full text of an address by Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, as prepared for delivery at a dinner of the "University of Pennsylvania Law Review" in Philadelphia on May 4, 1956:

It may be appropriate and possibly timely, in addressing a group of eminent lawyers, to discuss the techniques which the Communist leaders boast they intend to adopt to undermine the structure of free government based on the rule of law.

I have always been impressed at our seeming reluctance to give credence to official statements which are made by political leaders in other countries when we disagree fervently with what they say or when their statements seem at the time to be bombastic or unrealistic.

Take for example, Hitler's "Mein Kampf." Written in 1924, it had wide circulation in Germany and left a deep impression on the German people. Over here it received little attention until after the outbreak of World War II. Yet in this book was the blueprint of the Hitlerian policy of the superiority of the *Herrenvolk* ["master race"], of the manifest destiny of the German Reich, of the anti-Semitic campaigns, and of the whole trend of Hitlerism. If we Americans had really paid attention to that book in the decade or more after its publication, we would have been far better alerted to the dangers which Hitler represented for our own country and our civilization.

Much the same can be said about the writings of Lenin and Stalin. We were too inclined to laugh off their theories of world revolution and of the inevitability of conflict between Communism and the free world. Yet Stalin's writings on the "Problems of Leninism" and the "Short History of the Communist Party" were circulated in tens of millions of copies throughout the Soviet Union and the Communist world and finally received some slight attention here in this country.



Now we are told that the cruder forms of Stalinism are to be buried and we have the somewhat cold comfort of learning that we must look to Marx and Lenin and their teachings for guidance as to Soviet behavior.

Lenin's theories have never really been codified into a dogma which is as readily available as, for example, "Das Kapital." Lenin was very prolific in his writings. One can find many inconsistencies and paradoxes which today give a wide choice to the somewhat puzzled leaders in the Kremlin. It is no easy job, they find, to quietly bury history and the memory and the record of their late dictator and hero, Stalin. Now they are groping through the Marxist-Leninist philosophizing for precepts to give a new cloak to their present policy.

Some of these have taken form in the pronouncements of the recent Twentieth Party Congress. This was an extraordinary affair. Over a period of 12 days the Soviet leaders poured out a cascade of verbiage—the length of the speeches corresponding roughly to their respective positions in the present Soviet hierarchy. From Khrushchev we had an 8-hour speech and roughly 56,000 words, from Bulganin 4 hours and 27,000 words, from Mikoyan 2 hours and 14,000 words, and so on. For whatever significance length may have, Kaganovich and Malenkov were next in the standings, with Molotov reduced to a mere 8,000 words. The total amounted to some 500,000-600,000 words which the patient party faithful had to endure.

Apparently, however, the Soviet have found some practical uses for the oratorical achievements of the Twentieth Party Congress. The recent de-Stalinization program has rendered obsolete practically all of the history books and many standard textbooks used throughout the Soviet Union. Something has to replace these books and, until the new historians can rewrite a proper Soviet history, the speeches of the Party Congress are being used as textbooks.

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... "Weapons of subversion and civil war will still be used"

We have recently come across a directive issued by Marshal Zhukov to the Soviet armed forces which deals with the "historical" decisions of the Congress and accepts them as the basis for the political indoctrination of Soviet military personnel. This directive prescribes that the writings of the Congress are to serve the purpose of military indoctrination and discipline.

A further directive to the Soviet forces in the occupied areas issued a couple of days later indicates that Marshal Zhukov has taken action to withdraw from children's and officers' schools all the textbooks on World War II which attribute the victory to the military genius of Stalin. This directive ordered that the class hours previously scheduled for the study of such books were to be devoted instead to a study of the decisions of the Party Congress. Further, examinations were not to be given on those portions of the offending histories praising Stalin which had already been taught to the students.

Possibly like the students of the Soviet Union we should spend some time on what the Soviet leaders at the Party Congress have just been telling us. Tucked away in all this oratory are the statements of the policy which we may expect to see the present Kremlin leaders follow for the immediate future. They have told us in no uncertain words what they propose to do to us. It is better not to ignore this.

Old Objectives, New Methods

While we read in these speeches that war is no longer inevitable, and that some kind of coexistence is possible, it is clear that Soviet objectives remain basically unchanged, but, they say, can be achieved by new methods. For example, this is what Khrushchev said in his speech of Feb. 14, 1956:

"The right-wing bourgeois parties and their governments are suffering bankruptcy with increasing frequency. In these circumstances, the working class, by rallying around itself the toiling peasantry, the intelligentsia, all patriotic forces, and resolutely repulsing the opportunist elements who are incapable of giving up the policy of compromise with capitalists and landlords, is in a position to defeat the reactionary forces opposed to the popular interest, to capture a stable majority in the parliaments, and transform the latter from an instrument of bourgeois democracy into a genuine instrument of the peoples' will." "In such an event," he adds, "this institution, traditional in many highly developed capitalist countries, may become an organ of genuine democracy—democracy for the working people."

Translated into a little less flamboyant language, this means that the Communists propose to infiltrate our free legislative systems, to take over our parliamentary governments, and to use the freedom which our system of government gives to destroy all vestiges of that system. Though they did not quote it specifically, we can be sure that the Soviet leaders still accept the view announced most vividly in Lenin's own heyday, in the statutes of the Third Communist International in 1920—that "the Communist Party enters such institutions [as parliaments] not for the purpose of organization work, but in order to blow up the whole bourgeois machinery and the parliament itself from within."

Speaking in February a few days after Khrushchev, Mikoyan was a bit more precise. He told how the Soviet Government had accomplished these objectives in the past, and cited particularly the revolution in Czechoslovakia. This is how he put it:

"By force of the favorable postwar situation in Czechoslovakia, the socialist revolution was carried out by peaceful means. Communists came into power after having allied themselves not only with the parties of the working people which were close to them but also with the bourgeois parties which supported the common national front. The Czechoslovak people won by way of a peaceful development of revolution." And Mikoyan concluded that, "in their own way, yet also without civil war, the working class of Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Poland and other People's Democracies arrived at the victory of the socialist revolution."

Of course, I do not wish to leave with you the impression that even for the immediate future the Soviet proposes to limit their subversive techniques to the single policy of infiltrating Western parliamentary systems and then taking over and destroying these systems. The weapons of subversion and of contrived civil war will still be used wherever they think they can get away with them. And there will be no abandonment of the use of strikes and such forceful tactics, especially through labor unions.

Since the end of the war, they have ruled with an iron hand the largest labor unions in France and Italy, and they have substantial influence in a very large number of trade-unions in other countries. They have shown great ability to foment strikes for political Communist ends in countries where their parliamentary representation is nonexistent or negligible; as, for example, recent strikes in the Scandinavian countries and even the 1954 dock strike in England bore the marks of Communist initiative and control. Even here in the United States we are not immune to this type of sinister Communist penetration.

As there is no time to discuss all the programs of action the Soviet outlined at the Party Congress, I shall deal only with their clearly announced policy of manipulating our free parliamentary systems to their own ends.

How Subversion Is Worked

First, it may be useful to review briefly some past examples of their attempts to use the techniques of subverting free governments.

Here it is interesting to note that there is no instance where the Communists have taken over a country by free elections or have obtained a parliamentary majority by free elections. Unfortunately, it is also true that the Communists have moved in without having a majority status.

Past Communist take-overs of free countries have generally featured most, if not all, of these four elements:

1. The use of force from outside, or *the overhanging threat of force*.
2. The obtaining by the Communists through popular vote of at least an effective minority position.
3. The willingness of other parties, most often the parties of the left, but in some cases even parties of the extreme right, to join in political alliances and to admit Communists to key positions in the government.
4. Communist manipulation of key ministries so that non-Communist elements were driven out of positions of influence.

The best example of this process is, of course, that of Czechoslovakia. Mikoyan pointedly and ominously boasted of this Soviet "feat." Additional variants are found in the cases of Hungary and Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria. In all of these cases, the parties of the left, the actual

... "Stalin lulled" Czechoslovakia "into a feeling of security"

presence of Soviet forces on the spot played a decisive role. In Czechoslovakia, some of the same effect was obtained by the presence, just across the border, of strong Soviet forces and by the fact that the Soviet had previously occupied Prague and many other important Czech centers and had been able, by their terrorist and infiltration methods, to gain a position of strength which far exceeded the numerical representation in the population at large. In fact, they prepared the way for the coup before they evacuated their troops in 1945.

Beginning in 1945, Moscow exercised heavy pressure on the free Czech Government headed by President Benes. Hoping to be able to work with the Kremlin and anxious to insure the quick withdrawal of Russian troops, Benes went to Moscow in March of that year. He sought agreement on the forming of a coalition Government acceptable to the Soviets which would include some of the pro-Communist émigrés who had been collected in Moscow during the war and who flooded back to their home country to play roles preassigned to them by the Kremlin.

When the parliamentary Government of President Benes was actually reconstituted, the anti-Communist forces were badly divided among four or more parties. The Communist Party, as usual, presented a monolithic front. Under these conditions, the elections of 1946 gave the Communists 38 per cent of the votes. Thus they became the largest single party, their leader Gottwald was named Prime Minister, and the Communists were able to take over certain key ministries, including Interior, Information and Finance, with a crypto-Communist in charge of Defense.

During all this period, Stalin had cultivated President Benes and lulled him into a feeling of security as to Moscow's intentions. Meanwhile, they were building up their control of the Czech military forces, the trade-unions, and the inter-

nal-security policy. Finally, one of Moscow's principal "expeditors," Valerian Zorin, now Soviet Ambassador to Bonn, was sent to Prague and the minority Communist Party seized power in February, 1948, without firing a shot.

The principal Czech anti-Communist leaders either escaped abroad, committed suicide or were eliminated by arrest. Non-Communist parties were liquidated by the armed seizure of their headquarters and newspapers. A purge commission dealt with all so-called unreliable political leaders. President Benes was forced to resign in June, 1948, and the Communists took over and ever since have maintained supreme control.

There are many lessons to be learned from this historical precedent. When the Communists obtain an effective minority position in any parliamentary body, it is a sign of serious if not critical danger. If, in addition to that, they have important places in the Government and in particular control the Ministries of Defense and Interior, then that danger is greatly augmented and the country in question is ripe for take-over.

The situation in Hungary as the war was coming to a close was, as I suggested above, dominated by the Soviet military occupation. Nonetheless, the Hungarian non-Communist political leaders bravely started out to form a free Government, and in the first postwar elections in November, 1945, the anti-Communist parties had over 300 seats to about 70 for the Communists.

Then the trouble started. The Soviet military authorities proceeded to arrest, to drive from the country or terrify and blackmail the leaders of these non-Communist parties so that, in the next elections, in 1947, the Communists substantially increased their representation and became the largest single party, although the opposition groups still had a majority. The latter, however, were badly divided and, facing the

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NEWS FOR RUSSIA'S WORKERS—THE SHIFTING KREMLIN LINE

—Sovfoto

... "Democracy in Hungary was cut away, piece by piece"

pressure tactics of the Communists supported by the Soviet military, they were reduced to impotence and the Communists took over. By 1948 most of the anti-Communist leaders were dead, jailed or had fled.

Rakosi, one of the Hungarian renegade artisans of all this terror, still maintains a very precarious hold over the Hungarian Government as the stooge of Moscow. Today he is trembling in his boots since, as you can well imagine, he represented the Stalinist line and the Stalinist techniques, and sooner or later the new anti-Stalinist look may mean his downfall. In February of 1952, however, he was in fine fettle and described with glee and in the utmost detail the entire history and techniques of the destruction of the free Government of Hungary.

I recommend the study of his speech of Feb. 29, 1952, by those who are interested in understanding what Khrushchev and Mikoyan mean today when they tell us that one of their main weapons is to undermine our democratic institutions. Rakosi points out how the presence in the country of the Soviet Army prevented any attempt to defend with force the security of the anti-Communist government and served to protect the Communists from "imperialist intervention."

Meanwhile the Soviet Union, he states, shielded the Communist plotters in Hungary from "diplomatic interference of the great Western Powers." Rakosi frankly admitted that Soviet interference in Hungary's internal affairs was both "quite frequent and of great help in the strengthening of the Communist Party." He then describes, step by step, the success of the Communist intrigue and points out that the Smallholders' Party, the strongest anti-Communist party, was constantly compelled to expel or discard individuals discredited by Communist blackmail. This gradual day-by-day slicing off of hostile elements, i.e., non-Communist leaders, he described as "salami" techniques. In other words, he boasted that democracy in Hungary was cut away, piece by piece, just as we slice up a sausage.

By Ballots or by Bullets

These two illustrative examples, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, could be further emphasized by tracing the Communist take-over in Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria. But two examples may serve the purpose. It is useful to have the ballots but there are situations, and the Soviet Union is adept in bringing them about, where bullets prevail.

So much for our past experience with Soviet "Project Take-Over." Does the Kremlin now see fresh opportunities where the clearly announced program of Messrs. Khrushchev and Bulganin might now be put into operation?

First, a word on the element of force. There are few places in the world where a free country is so at the mercy of Soviet or Communist Chinese force as the satellites stood in 1945-47. Thanks to NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] in Europe, to SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] in the Far East, to the Baghdad Pact in the Middle East, and to individual commitments of the U. S. in other areas, the free world's umbrella of strength extends almost all the way around the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc. We sometimes think of this great effort, in which the U. S. has played the leading part, as designed only to meet force. But we must never overlook that it also has vital importance in meeting more subtle Communist tactics.

Of course the blunting of the elements or threat of force does not do the whole job. It does tend to channel Soviet activities into the struggle for power by other means.

In this struggle, the Communists must be met with the

opportunities where they now have the strongest penetrations into the parliamentary machinery of free governments.

In several countries these penetrations are serious.

Red Lawmakers in Italy, France

In the Italian Parliament of 590 members, there are now 143 Communist members. To these must be added 75 Nenni fellow-traveling left-wing Socialists, or a total of 218, who consistently vote and act with the Communists. Together in the last elections, in 1953, their total popular vote was 9.5 millions, or 35.5 per cent of the total.

The French Chamber of Deputies presents another situation the Kremlin may be studying. There are today about 150 Communist members in the Chamber, out of a present total of about 600.

In Indonesia, the Communist Party received 6 million votes, or 17 per cent of the total electorate, in the elections of September, 1955, and they have a representation of 39 members, or 16 per cent of the total of the Indonesian Assembly.

In some 35 countries of the world, the Communist Party is illegal. Here their rank and file, though seriously large in several cases, must work through underground channels and the more obvious fellow-traveling front organizations, without direct political representation in parliamentary bodies. However, in such areas as Singapore, Communist-influenced parties have an important position and serve as effective vehicles for Communist activity.

Once established as a party to be reckoned with, the next crucial factor is the ability of Communist parties to enter into alliances with other parties so as to increase their electoral strength, and above all to participate in governments formed by the alliance. The prospects and partners for such alliances—united fronts or "popular fronts"—vary greatly between countries.

In Italy, the Communists could hardly aspire to an early participation in any Italian government, but there are some supporters for the idea of an "opening to the left" to admit the Nenni Socialists to the Government. This would be about the same as admitting the Communists themselves.

In France, the dominant wing of the Socialist Party is opposed to any dealing with the Communists. Of course, Communist readiness to do business with anyone is wholly consistent with the Communist record, back to and beyond the time when the Communists joined with the Nazis to destroy democratic government in Germany.

A few years ago I would have thought that Communist parties in Europe would have great difficulty ever again in obtaining allies among any non-Communist parties. Then the experience of 1939-41 was still vivid when the Communists tried to sabotage the war effort against Hitler up until Moscow itself became involved. Today, however, the danger of parliamentary compromises with the Communists, even in Europe, is not to be ignored.

In Asia, this threat is even greater because it is generally less well understood. A recent Indonesian government permitted Communist influence to reach far into the Ministry of Defense. More than in Europe, the Communist parties have managed in many countries to acquire a dangerous degree of "respectability" and of acceptance as "just another political party."

On the other hand, despite the relatively solid basis for action which they have in many countries and the preparations for this campaign which they have been making over the past 10 years or more, the Communists face real obstacles.

First of all, they have alerted us to their program. While people world-wide sometimes seem dangerously complacent

... Reds show "skill in manipulating free institutions"

and even skeptical, it may yet be possible to rouse them to their dangers.

Secondly, the Communists do not have any acknowledged party members in high government positions, of Cabinet rank, for example, in any of the free countries, even where they have large parliamentary representation. In both France and Italy, in the immediate postwar period, they did have such representation, but were thrown out in the early years following the war.

While undoubtedly in many free countries they have infiltrated sensitive positions, this has been done on a clandestine basis and here and there vigilant steps are being taken to ferret them out. In particular today they do not have positions of control in the army or in the internal-security services of any free country. Naturally, they are looking forward to any chance of improving this situation.

Finally, the free world has had a real assist from Khrushchev.

Not only was his dinner with the executives of the British Labor Party somewhat less than cordial in atmosphere, but he rejected out of hand the request of the British Laborites—in which, by the way, Gaitskell and Bevan joined forces completely—for the freeing of certain Social Democrats known to be imprisoned behind the Iron Curtain. On his return to Russia, Khrushchev has continued the attack and accused the Laborites of trying to "curry favor with reactionary circles" by raising the question of the Social Democrats. This episode is not likely to incline the European Socialists in the direction of a "ride on the tiger."

Doing Tricks With Parliaments

All in all, the Communists must, however, see some prospects of success by their so-called "parliamentary means." It is worthwhile to note that the Communists have made some very sophisticated studies of the government structure of free countries. They have learned how to manipulate their parliamentary representation, once elected, and also how to get elected. Further, they know quite well what types of parliamentary systems are most vulnerable to their type of subversive action.

They endeavor, in every way possible, to influence the constitutional structure of free countries so as to eliminate a strong executive. They themselves have collective or one-man dictatorships, reserving all power in the hands of the few with their party congresses represented by hand-picked, impotent and powerless stooges. Presumably they judge this to be the most secure form of government, the least subject to outside attack. They consider that the governments which are most vulnerable to their tactics are those at the other extreme, where all power is given to the people's representatives, with as little delegation as possible to the executive.

In connection with the formulation of the French Constitution in 1945, the Communists made a strong attack on the idea of a powerful executive. They fought to divide up the authority between various elected bodies. In fact, the first draft of the postwar Constitution went so far in this direction that the French people repudiated it, and a less Communist-oriented Constitution was then voted.

In Italy, in 1946, they voted as a bloc to destroy the institution of the monarchy.

When issues of this nature arise, one always can tell where Communist influence will be thrown.

Then, insofar as the electoral procedures are concerned, they abhor anything in the nature of a two-party system and majority rule which, by and large, has been a bulwark of

free institutions. Their effort is to favor a multiplicity of parties. This opens the door to intrigue and helps to build up the minority and weaken the majority rule.

In general, they like the idea of the voting systems under which even small minorities have a chance of gaining deputies in parliament. In fact, they have often found that the proportional system of voting could serve them as a secret weapon.

In certain free countries where the proportional system prevails, the non-Communist parties have tried to introduce various means of defeating this Communist maneuver. In France, for example, they have the system of electoral alliances—*apparentements*—and in Italy somewhat the same system has prevailed. Under this system, linked tickets of several parties are presented. The French electoral law of 1951, which is still in effect, provides that, if the linked parties gather an absolute majority in a given constituency, they gather in all the seats for that district. In the 1951 French election, this system worked quite well and reduced the Communist representation from 164 seats to 97, whereas under the pure proportional representation of the Communists would have had 172. But these tactics do not always work. In the 1956 French elections, fought out under the same system, the failure of the non-Communist parties to join as they had done in 1951 resulted in the Communists' obtaining approximately the same proportion of the seats as they would have had under the straight proportional system.

As a New Yorker, I well recall that we introduced proportional representation in voting for the New York City Council shortly before World War II. As a result of this, two Communists were elected to the City Council on an open Communist ticket. Under a majority system, the Communists would not have elected anybody.

I may add that New York City learned a lesson and the proportional system was abolished.

The Communists do not restrict their activities to manipulating electoral laws in their favor, or to appealing to groups of minority interests who, like the Communists, would get nowhere without the proportional system. They also do not hesitate to take strong action to frustrate the will of the voter after the ballot boxes have been closed.

Fast Work in Italian Election

An important case of this kind occurred in Italy in the 1953 elections. Here the non-Communist Italian parties tried to graft onto their proportional system an element of the direct-majority type of voting system by providing that any party or coalition of parties which achieved more than 50 per cent of the vote would automatically receive a bonus bringing the total seats to at least 65 per cent. The vote in this election was very close and, in fact, the affiliated anti-Communist Italian parties appeared to have obtained a scant margin over the 50 per cent. By clever postelection tactics and catching the authorities napping, the Communists were able to contest and fraudulently throw out a sufficient number of votes—several hundred thousand—to reduce the non-Communists just below the 50 per cent mark. They got away with it. The system for handling challenged votes was just too archaic.

These examples show the skill and adroitness of the Communists in manipulating our free institutions and the mechanisms of free elections. These are complicated, often imperfect.

We have had our own election frauds. At least they were not attributable to a foreign power. The Communists try to

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... "Soviet Communists themselves are having no easy sailing"

use our shortcomings to promote their own ends, hopefully looking forward to the day when they can successfully maneuver themselves into a position of such power that they can destroy the entire free electoral system.

Of course, as I have suggested, the Communists now hope that people more and more will come to look at them as just another political party, a bit to the left but still of sufficient respectability so as not to cause any lifting of eyebrows against those who are members of it. They openly boast that, just as in the Italian situation, they will soon make peace with Socialists elsewhere and that together they will go forward to organize what is generally known as the popular front.

Socialists Reject "Popular Front"

The Kremlin still hopes for this, despite the fact that Communist united fronts have been rudely rejected by the Socialist parties in France, Germany, Austria and elsewhere. Also, they find themselves in some embarrassment here because of Khrushchev's crude anti-Socialist remarks in London and Moscow to which I have already alluded.

In concluding, I wish to say a word about the ability of parliamentary systems in the free world to meet and turn back the offensive which the Soviet has announced against it.

On my desk in Washington, I keep handy a series of letters which a century ago Lord Macaulay exchanged with a Mr. H. S. Randall, an American citizen, who had just published a life of Jefferson and engaged in considerable correspondence with Macaulay with regard to the Jeffersonian philosophy of government which he, Randall, was defending against Macaulay's attacks.

In the letter of May 23, 1857, Macaulay, in writing to Randall, expressed the view that "institutions purely democratic must sooner or later destroy liberty, or civilization, or both." He went on to say, "I have not the smallest doubt that, if we had a purely democratic government here [England], the effect would be the same. Either the poor would plunder the rich, and civilization would perish, or order and property would be saved by a strong military government, and liberty would perish."

"You may think that your country," says Macaulay to Randall, "enjoys an exemption from these evils. I will frankly own to you that I am of a very different opinion. Your fate I believe to be certain, though it is deferred by a physical cause. As long as you have a boundless extent of fertile and unoccupied land, your labouring population will be far more at ease than the labouring population of the Old World; and, while that is the case, the Jeffersonian policy may continue to exist without causing any fatal calamity."

Then Macaulay goes on to say that when New England will be as thickly populated as old England, when we have Manchesters and Birminghams, our institutions will be put to the test, distress will make laborers mutinous and discontented, the demagogue will take over from the statesman, "spoliation will increase the distress" and "distress will produce fresh spoliation." Either a Caesar or Napoleon will take over, he writes, or "your republic will be as fearfully plundered and laid waste by barbarians in the twentieth century as the Roman Empire was in the fifth; with this difference, that the Huns and Vandals who ravaged the Roman Empire came from without, and that your Huns and Vandals will have been engendered within your own country by your own institutions."

The most pungent phrase in this pungent letter is Macaulay's conclusion: "Your Constitution is all sail and no anchor."

In the hundred years that have elapsed since these words were written, we have proved that even as wise a man as Macaulay can be wrong. We have found an anchor not only in the Constitution given us by the wisdom of our forefathers but, even more than that, in the development of a sound electorate whose common sense has protected us from the evils which Lord Macaulay predicted.

We must recognize, however, that we are far more fortunate than most of the peoples of this earth. True, in this century, we have gone through two world wars, but our land was virtually untouched by any enemy. We have a vast economic base, plenty of room for expansion, food in superabundance. We have had few of the grave economic, political, and population problems that face so many other countries. Many of these countries, particularly those which have a new-found freedom, have yet finally to prove that the bases of their representative governmental systems are firmly anchored and that they will not be threatened by some of the dangers which Macaulay so vividly describes.

Furthermore, in addition to the internal stresses and strains of the democratic processes, we are now definitely alerted by the official pronouncements of the Kremlin that the Communists working from the outside propose to do everything they can to aggravate the difficulties of constitutional government in the free world. Hence, many countries will have to face not only the domestic problems of the type which Macaulay has cited, but also serious roadblocks interposed by an international troublemaker, to the achieving of Lincoln's great dream of government of the people, by the people, for the people.

In the troubled political atmosphere prevailing in many parts of the world today, we are told that a great foreign power, with vast resources to back a program of subversion and cajolery, proposes to do everything that it can to see to it that free governments shall perish and that dictatorships of the proletariat, allied with Moscow, shall be established throughout the length and breadth of the lands.

Thus, Communism, bred out of the ravages of World War I and strengthened by the devastation of World War II, is attempting to guide the sails of the ships of state of many free countries, particularly those where free institutions are either in their infancy or have been weakened by the stresses of two world wars.

"Danger but No Panic"

It is well to recognize the danger. There is no ground for panic. As I have suggested, nowhere outside of the U.S.S.R., with the qualified exceptions of Czechoslovakia and Guatemala, have the Communists succeeded in subverting a free government except with the aid of armed force. This is true for China, North Vietnam, and the other Eastern European satellites. Meanwhile, the Soviet Communists themselves are having no easy sailing. They have thrown over their pilot of the last two decades and have taken on some apprentices trained in the old school but who may find themselves more and more out of line with many of their crew.

Fortunately, good charts and a knowledge of where the shoals lie are a mariner's best guide. The Kremlin leaders have told us what they propose to do; their course has been charted. It is up to the leaders of the free world, working together as allies and friends, to help to uncover and to frustrate this Communist design which otherwise could threaten to wreck the free institutions of many countries and even endanger our own.